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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
BANKS AND BANKING-LIABILITY OF STOCKHOLDERS-WHETHER OR NOT CASH
PURcHASER OF SHARES IN HOLDING COMPANY WHICH OWNS STOCK OF BANK IS
SUBJECT TO SUPERADDED LIABILITY IMPOSsD ON STOCKHOLDERS OF INSOLVENT
BANK-The management of a national and of a state bank located in
Kentucky, seeking to establish an alliance between them, organized a
holding company with broad charter powers and worked out an exchange
of shares so that the holding company eventually acquired most of the
shares of the two banks. In addition to such exchange, however, the
holding company sold some shares for cash to the former bank stockholders and marketed a large number to other cash purchasers who
did not own bank stock. With funds obtained in this fashion, the holding
company then acquired majority interests in several other banks as
well as shares in an insurance company, but in little more than a year
after this varied financial career began the banks and the holding company were in receivership. Assessment of double liability having been
the receiver thereof
made against the national bank shareholders,'

1 12 U. S. C. A. § 63. It should be noted that the effect of that statute was nullified, after the operative facts of the instant case occurred, by 12 U.S.C.A. § 64a,
but the problem is still a live one under many state statutes.
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notified the shareholders of the holding company that he intended to
proceed against them in the event he was unable to collect from their
corporation. Suit by the bank receiver against the holding company2
resulted in the collection of but a small amount on the double liability
assessment, so the receiver instituted action against the holding company
shareholders to recover from each his proportionate part of the balance
of the assessment. Such suit was dismissed by the district court, 3 and
the decree was affirmed by the intermediate appellate court. 4 The
United States Supreme Court, although divided five to four, decided in
the case of Anderson v. Abbott 5 to reverse and remand with directions to
uphold the suit against all shareholders of the holding company, whether
they became such by exchange of bank stock or by cash purchase, resting its decision on the proposition that the protection of bank depositors
was a matter of such paramount concern that double liability might be
imposed on a person several links removed from the actual holder of the
bank stock.
There can be little dispute with the decision insofar as it concerns the
liability of persons who traded in their bank shares for those of the holding
company. Decisions relating to shareholders' statutory liability disclose a
trend on the part of the courts to disregard the corporate entity and to
go directly against the beneficial owner of the bank stock. In such cases,
liability is usually imposed on either of two theories: that it is the beneficial owner who really owes the fundamental duty, or else that the court
is entitled to pierce the corporate entity.6 The latter theory is most likely
to be applied where bank stocks form a substantial part of the assets of
the holding company,7 whereas the former one is apt to be chosen where
the holding company is merely a shell organized to avoid the double
liability.8 In Fors v. Farrell,9 for example, several holding companies
existed, each holding for the next link, yet the court knifed through each
intermediate entity to set liability on the ultimate holding company. But
good faith and honest motives have not deterred courts from fastening the
liability on the holding company shareholders, for if a holding company
could be set up to enable the holder of bank shares to sidestep his double
liability while he retained the benefits of his bank stock, it would be too
easy to circumvent the statute.' 0
More significant, though, is that part of the decision of the instant
2 Keyes v. American Life & Accident Ins. Co., 1 F. Supp. 512 (1932), affirmed
in Laurent v. Anderson, 70 F. (2d) 819 (1934).
3 Anderson v. Abbott, 32 F. Supp. 328 (1940).
4 Ibid., 127 F. (2d) 696 (1942).
5 -U. S.-,64 S. Ct. 531, 88 L. Ed. (adv.) 535 (1944). Mr. Justice Jackson wrote
a dissenting opinion, concurred in by Justices Roberts, Reed and Frankfurter.
6 See McClanahan, "Bank Stock Liability and the Holding Company Device,"
19 CHICAGO-KENT LAw RrviEw 160 (1941).
7 Barbour v. Thomas, 86 F. (2d) 510 (1936).
8 See Corker v. Soper, 53 F. (2d) 190 (1931), cert. den. 285 U. S. 540, 52 S. Ct.
313, 76 L. Ed. 933 (1932).
9 271 Mich 358, 260 N.W. 886 (1935).
10 Metropolitan Holding Co. v. Snyder, 79 F. (2d) 263 (1935), presents the best
application of this doctrine.
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case which imposes liability on those who paid cash for their shares in
the holding company. Involved therein is the question of whether or not
the underlying policy of the double-liability statutes is so compelling that
the obligations thereof should be fastened upon a buyer of shares in the
holding company for cash as well as on the person who formerly held
bank shares and traded them for such stock. It is on this point that the
court divided sharply, the-majority finding that it made no difference to
the question of liability, while the dissent thought such holding constituted
a "trap for unwary and unwarned investors."" While statutes fixing superadded liability have never contemplated that lack of knowledge on the
part of the ordinary holder of stock in a bank should operate to defeat the
assessment of liability against him, there may be reason why a lack of
knowledge thereof on the part of the stockholder in a holding company
should entitle him to more sympathetic treatment. Rules of statutory
liability are usuallyharsh in operation as their foundations rest not in any
fault on the part of the shareholder but rather in apposition thereto. Yet,
investors have often found that they have bought a liability for the debts
of the enterprise as well as a benefit, when such may have been farthest
12
from their intention. In Horgan v. Morgan, for example, the certificate
that it represented "nondeclared
defendant
of stock purchased by the
assessable shares of stock," but the shareholder was nevertheless held
liable on certain promissory notes as if he were a partner. In Bartlett v.
Stephens, 13 the shareholder who had been induced to become such on the
part of the corporation, but who gave notice of rescission and tendered
return of the stock, was held liable for the court said: "if . . . a person
voluntarily assumes the relation of a stockholder . . . he fixes his own
status and is liable for the consequences."' 14 In like fashion, the case of
Mundell v. Cravens15 will serve as authority in Illinois for the rule that a
shareholder who was induced by fraud to purchase bank stock has no
defense to a suit for superadded liability. The majority holding is not,
therefore, without support and serves to re-emphasize the wisdom of
investigation before investing.
It should not be difficult, in the light of these decisions, for the Illinois
Supreme Court to produce a holding comparable to that of the United
States Supreme Court in the Anderson case. There is language in the
16
Appellate Court decision in Flanagan v. Madison Square State Bank
a
complaint,
upheld
there
the
court
which points in that direction for
against a motion to strike, that sought to force shareholders of the holding
company which owned bank stock to stand responsible for the added
liability. When discussing the theory to support such complaint, the court
said: "It is a rule recognized in this State and elsewhere, that where it is
sought to hold the real owner of the stock though his name does not appear
11 -U. S.-at-, 64 S. Ct. 531 at 547, 88 L. Ed. 535 at 552.
12 233 Mass. 381, 124 N.E. 32 (1919).
Is137 Minn. 213, 163 N.W. 288 (1917). The case was cited with approval in
App. 304 (1921), cert. den.
Rosenfeld v. Horwich, 221 Ill.
14 137 Minn. 213 at 215, 163 N.W. 288 at 289.
App. 447 (1932).
15 267 Ill.
16 302 Ill. App. 468, 24 N.E. (2d) 202 (1939).
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upon the transfer books of the bank, the court will determine who is the
real owner and decree accordingly.' ' 7 Although that action was begun
against the shareholders of a holding company without attempting any
distinction between the original holders of bank stock and those who
bought holding company shares for cash, such language is strongly akin
to that used by other courts when applying the "beneficial-owner" theory
of liability. It is unlikely, therefore, that our Supreme Court will draw
any distinction between the two classes of shareholders.
Since lack of fault on the part of the owner of bank shares will constitute no defense to his liability, it is difficult to see why the liability of
an owner of holding company shares should be less exacting, particularly
where the assets of the holding company consist of bank stocks and it
lacks financial integrity to respond adequately to the burden of the added
liability.' 8 As the holding company shareholder stands to benefit through
any dividends passed on to the holding company by the bank, his benefit
being no less or no more than that of the ordinary bank shareholder, the
detriment which accompanies the ownership of holding company stock
should be on a par with that of the ordinary bank stockholder.
J. E. REEVES
CoRPoRATIoNs-DIssoLUION AND FoRFETRE OF FRAIcmsE--WHETHER PRIOR
DIssoLUTION OF CORPoRATioN IN SEPARATE PRoCEEDING BROUGHT BY ATTORNEY
GENERAL IS FATAL TO EXISTENCE OF EQUITY JURISDICTION TO APPOINT REcEIVER
TO LIQUIDATE AssETs OF SUCH DIssOLvED CoRPoRATIoN-The facts in the recent
case of McNeill v. Savin' showed that an Illinois corporation had been
organized in 1937 and shortly thereafter it leased a store building for a
term of years. A sizeable sum was paid into the corporation for its capital
stock but it never engaged in active merchandising and the promoters,
being unable to raise sufficient capital, decided to abandon the business.
The assets of the corporation, consisting solely of cash, were therefore
returned to the contributors less certain preliminary expenses. In 1939,
the corporation was dissolved in an involuntary proceeding brought by
the Attorney General, but prior to dissolution the lessors obtained judgments against it which remained unsatisfied. About a year and a half
17 302 Ill. App. 468 at 473, 24 N.E. (2d) 202 at 204. See also Galinski v. Adler.
302 Ill. App. 474, 24 N.E. (2d) 205 (1939), wherein a complaint for discovery
and accounting against a holding company to ascertain if certain defendants,
who also had owned bank stock, had exchanged their shares for holding company stock was held good on motion to dismiss. Of like interest is Trupp v. First
Englewood State Bank, 307 Ill. App. 258, 30 N.E. (2d) 198 (1940).
18 It is interesting to note that suit against the holding company was deemed
not to be res adjudicata so as to prevent further action against its shareholders:
Anderson v. Abbott, -U. S.- at -, 64 S. Ct. 531 at 534, 88 L. Ed. (adv.) 535 at
538. As partial satisfaction by the holding company was treated as amounting
only to a pro tanto discharge, the court concluded that suit for the balance could
still be brought against the individual shareholders on their separate liability
arising from their beneficial ownership in the insolvent bank. That theory of
liability was treated as creating an entirely different issue from the one involved in the suit against the record owner of the shares of the bank.
1 244 Wis. 552, 13 N.W. (2d) 82 (1944).
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after the corporation had been dissolved, the lessors filed a creditor's
bill in an Illinois court seeking to enforce collection of such judgments.
A receiver was appointed therein and, upon petition, he was given authority to bring suit in Wisconsin against the non-resident subscribers to reach
assets in their hands belonging to the defunct corporation. The instant
case was accordingly started by the Illinois receiver in Wisconsin just
before the expiration of the two-year period after dissolution of the corporation 2 and resulted in a judgment for plaintiff in the trial court. Upon
appeal to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, it was held that such judgment
should be affirmed.
The significant issue in the case was defendant's contention that the
receiver had no right to bring the instant action because the Illinois court
lacked jurisdiction to appoint a receiver for an already dissolved corporation. His contention was based on the supposition that, under the
Illinois statutes, the only power enjoyed by the court was to appoint a
receiver prior to dissolution as an aid to a suit asking for liquidation and
dissolution of the company. The Wisconsin court, after examining the
sections of the Illinois Business Corporations Act, stated that it found no
provision therein specifically requiring that a receiver had to be appointed
prior to dissolution, nor could it find that it was the legislative intent that
such should be the rule. It therefore deemed that the general power of a
court of equity was sufficient to support the appointment.
Section 86 of the statute3 does provide that courts of equity shall have
power to liquidate the assets and business of a corporation when, among
other things, suit is brought by an unsatisfied judgment creditor who has
had execution on his judgment returned unsatisfied or whose claim is
admitted by the corporation to be due. Another section expressly gives
4
the court power to appoint a receiver in connection with such litigation.
But these sections contemplate that liquidation shall occur before dissolution for it is provided that the actual dissolution shall not take place until
a final decree is entered in such proceedings. 5 The claim of the defendant
would seem, on the surface, to be not entirely without merit. It would
seem, however, that recognition must also be given to Section 94 of the
Business Corporations Act which specifically provides that dissolution of
a corporation shall not take away or impair any remedy given against
such corporation, its directors, or shareholders, for any liability incurred
prior to such dissolution if suit thereon is brought and service had within
two years after the date of such dissolution. 6 If the prior dissolution prevented the appointment of a receiver and the gathering in of the corporate
assets, the remedy intended by such section would well be nullified.
It is true that it has been said that courts of equity lack general power
to appoint liquidating receivers for corporations and may appoint such
2

IMl. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 32, § 157.94.

Ibid.,
Ibid.,
5 Ibid.,
6 Ibid.,
3
4

§ 157.86.
§ 157.87.
§ 157.91.
§ 157.94.

DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS

only when expressly authorized by statute, 7 but the basis of such rule
seems to be that the corporations there involved were going concerns and
the appointment of a receiver would be tantamount to dissolution. As
chancery courts are without jurisdiction to decree a dissolution without
specific statutory authority,8 it might well be held that the same rule
should apply to the appointment of a receiver. In the case before the
Wisconsin court, however, the appointment of the receiver occurred after
the corporation had been dissolved, hence such decisions and the rule
announced therein can hardly be considered applicable.
The precise question presented has not been decided in Illinois. Before
the enactment of the Business Corporations Act in 1933 probably no problem of corporation law was more obscure than that relating to the jurisdiction of a court of equity to appoint a receiver for a corporation. 9 Such
confusion resulted, for the most part, from lack of an adequate statutory
definition of such jurisdiction. Although the existence of the power was
generally denied, 10 there is dicta in one case that the ordinary powers of
equity to deal with cases of fraud would include the power to appoint a
receiver for a corporation." When interpreting Illinois law applicable to
the case before it, a federal court once found, on a factual situation similar
to that involved in the instant case, that the appointment of a receiver for
a corporation after dissolution was within the general powers of an equity
court. 1 2 Such decision relied on a statutory provision then in effect'" which
corresponded closely to Section 94 of the present statute. It was held that
as such provision continued corporate existence after dissolution for a
period of two years in order to permit creditors to assert their claims, the
net effect thereof was to make the corporation and its officers, after dissolution, a trustee of the corporate assets for the primary benefit of any
unpaid creditors. As so interpreted, authority in the court to appoint a
receiver was regarded as an incident to its original jurisdiction over
trusts. The reasoning of that decision appears to be sound and could well
have influenced the outcome of the instant case.
7 People ex rel. Palmer v. Peoria Life Ins. Co., 357 Ill. 486, 192 N.E. 420
(1934); Steenrod v. L. M. Gross Co., 334 Ill. 362, 166 N.E. 82 (1929); Wheeler v.
Pullman Iron and Steel Co., 143 Ill. 197, 32 N.E. 420, 17 L.R.A. 818 (1892);
Wiedoeft v. Frank Holton & Co., 294 Ill. App. 118, 13 N.E. (2d) 854 (1938);
National Bureau of Property Admin. v. Tax Service Ass'n, 290 Ill. App. 152,
8 N.E. (2d) 51 (1937).
8 Wheeler v. Pullman Iron and Steel Co., 143 Il. 197, 32 N.E. 420, 17 L.R.A. 818
(1892). Prior to statute, dissolution was accomplished by quo warranto proceedings at law: Baker v. The Administrator of Backus, 32 Ill. 79 (1863).
9 Laws 1872, p. 302, § 25; Laws 1919, p. 312, §§ 53-4; Laws 1927, p. 361, § 1.
10 People ex rel. Palmer v. Peoria Life Ins. Co., 357 Ill. 486, 192 N.E. 420
(1934); People ex rel. Barrett v. Shurtleff, 353 Ill. 248, 187 N.E. 271 (1933);
Steenrod v. L. M. Gross Co., 334 Ill. 362, 166 N.E. 82 (1929); Nelson v. Toluca
State Bank, 334 Ill. 83, 165 N.E. 191 (1929); People ex rel. Seeman v. Greer
College, 302 Ill. 538, 135 N. E. 80. (1922); Blanchard Bro. & Lane v. S. G. Gay
Co., 289 Ill. 413, 124 N.E. 616 (1919); Herrin Supply Co. v. Freeman Coal Min. Co.,
255 Ill. App. 196 (1929).
11 Abbott v. Loving, 303 Ill. 154, 135 N.E. 442 (1922).
12 Olmstead v. Distilling & Cattle-Feeding Co., 73 F. 44 (1895).
13 Laws 1895, p. 130.
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As it is usually impossible to cover every eventuality by statute, the
problem presented in the instant case has arisen with variations in a
number of states. The general rule has there been established that, in the
absence of a governing statute, courts of equity will take charge of the
property of a dissolved corporation through a receiver in order to collect
and apply the same to the payment of its debts or for distribution to its
stockholders. 14 No Illinois case can be found where the facts have required
an expression of the attitude of the local courts on this point but it would
seem probable that the Illinois courts would conclude to uphold the jurisdiction of an equity court to appoint a receiver for a dissolved corporation
provided the application for the same occurred within the two-year period
after dissolution. Justification for such assumption may be found either in
the general rule noted above or on the narrower ground adopted by the
Wisconsin court. It is unthinkable that an Illinois court would ever hold
that equity could not exercise its powers to preserve the assets of a dissolved corporation or arrange for the proper distribution thereof, even
though express statutory authority does not exist.
C. F. MARQuiS
EASEMENTS-ExTENT OF RIGHT, USE, AND OBSTRUCTIoN-WETHER

OR NOT

RAILRoAD MAY LEASE PORTION OF ITS EASEMENT OF RiGT OF WAY FOR USE ix
ORDINARY RnrAm BusiNEss-In the case of Mitchell v. Illinois Central Railroad Company' it appeared that the defendant railroad had secured an
easement for the purpose of constructing, maintaining, and operating a
railway, with all necessary appurtenances, over the land presently owned
by plaintiff. Thereafter, the railroad leased a portion of such right of way
to one Beach to be used by him as a site for a combination bulk oil and
filling station. Such lease was afterwards approved by the Illinois Commerce Commission and, pursuant to its terms, Beach entered into possession and engaged in the business of selling gasoline and similar products
both at retail and wholesale. Plaintiff thereupon sued to enjoin the operation of the retail aspect of the business, probably to eliminate competition
with a retail station operated by himself on adjacent property, contending
that the lease was invalid as exceeding the easement rights of the railroad
company. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the
lease was a proper exercise of the rights conferred by the easement. Upon
appeal, such decree was reversed by the Appellate Court for the Third

14 United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. 106, 31 S. Ct. 632, 55 L.
Ed. 663 (1911); Olmstead v. Distilling & Cattle-Feeding Co., 73 F. 44 (1895); Burg
v. Smith, 222 Ala. 600, 133 So. 687 (1931); Gibbs v. Morgan, 9 Ida. 100, 72 P.
733 (1903); Board of School Directors v. Meredith, 140 La. 269, 72 So. 960 (1916);
State v. Farmers' and Merchants' Ins. Co., 90 Neb. 664, 134 N.W. 284, Ann. Cas.
1913B 643 (1912); Talling v. Elbs, 120 N. Y. S. 693 (1910); Tiffin Glass Co. v.
Stoehr, 54 Ohio St. 157, 43 N.E. 279 (1896); Hall v. City Park Brewing Co., 294
Pa. 127, 143 A. 582 (1928). See also Thompson, Corporations (2d Ed.), Vol. 5,
1 6552; Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporations (Perm. Ed.), Vol. 16,
11 8197-8; 23 R. C. L. 36; 54 A.L. R. 1127.
1 384 Ill. 258, 51 N.E. (2d) 271 (1943), reversing 317 Ill. App. 501, 47 N.E. (2d)
115 (1943). Murphy, J., noted a dissent on rehearing.
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District with directions to grant the injunction; that court considering that
the use for retail purposes amounted to an undue additional burden on
the fee. 2 A certificate of importance having been granted, the Illinois
Supreme Court reversed such action and affirmed the decree of the trial
court dismissing the complaint.
That the railroad might lease a portion of the easement for use as a
bulk station was apparently conceded by the plaintiff, hence that problem
was not in issue.3 The prime question, then, was one with regard to the
right to operate a retail station.4 On that point, there appears to be considerable confusion as to what use may be made by a railroad of its right
of way. Such confusion may be due to several reasons. The first of these
reasons turns upon the nature of the service the railroad is called upon to
perform. Its prime function of transportation requires exclusive occupancy
of the right of way, hence the easement granted to it differs from the
common easement across the land of another. 5 Being held to the highest
degree of care, it is necessary that the railroad should keep its right of
way clear from anything that may endanger the operation of its trains. 6
The fencing in of its right of way, thereby preventing access of the public
and abutting property owners, has undoubtedly been instrumental in
facilitating such service even to the point of causing the public to believe
that the railroad has exclusive jurisdiction though it does not own the fee
7
and has only an easement in the land.
If the use in question in the instant case was likely to interfere with
the operation of the railroad, it certainly should be denied as being inconsistent with the original purpose of the easement. For such reason it has
been held that it cannot license a third person to construct other lines
along its right of way, 8 nor grant an easement in a private way over its
tracks, 9 or one along its right of way for the purpose of laying water pipes
not intended to be used for purposes of the railroad. 10
317 Ill. App. 501, 47 N.E. (2d) 115 (1943).
3 The testimony tended to indicate that the property might be used for that
purpose, and it was the lessee's claim that such was his intention but that his
operations had been hindered by the pending litigation: 384 Ill. 258 at 263, 51 N.E.
(2d) 271 at 273. On that point generally, see Weir v. Standard Oil Co., 136 Miss.
205, 101 So. 290 (1924).
4 The Supreme Court placed stress upon the fact that leases of the character
in question were a matter of common practice and had received the approval
of the Illinois Commerce Commission. The Appellate Court had rejected the
latter point on the ground that the commission was a mere administrative
agency and, as such, had no jurisdiction to adjudicate controverted individual
or contract rights: 317 Ill. App. 501 at 509, 47 N.E. (2d) 115 at 119.
5 Compare Illinois Central R. Co. v. Houghton, 126 Ill. 233, 18 N.E. 301, 1
L. R. A. 213(1888), with Tacoma Safety Deposit Co. v. City of Chicago, 247 Iln.
192, 93 N.E. 153, 31 L. R. A. (N.S.) 868 (1910).
6 Cairo, V. & C. Ry. Co. v. Brevoort, 62 F. 129, 25 L. R. A. 527 (1894).
7 Joseph v. Evans, 338 Ill. 11, 170 N.E. 10 (1930); Branch v. Cent. Trust Co.,
320 Ill. 432, 151 N.E. 284 (1926); Walker v. Ill. Cent. R. Co., 215 Ill. 610, 74 N.E.
812 (1905); Wiggins Ferry Co. v. Ohio etc. R. Co., 94 Ill. 83 (1879).
8 Muncie Electric Light Co. v. Joliff, 59 Ind. App. 349, 109 N.E. 433 (1915).
9 Lincoln v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 26 N.D. 504, 144 N.W. 713 (1914).
10 Canada Southern R. W. Co. v. Niagara Falls, 22 Ont. 41 (1892).
2
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On the other hand, the wisdom of utilizing unused space not needed
for transportation has led both Illinois and other states to permit railroads
to lease portions of the right of way for warehouse and similar purposes,
but the power to grant leases of that character has been limited to situations in which the exercise thereof did not interfere with the duties of
the railroad to the public."
Recognition must, however, be accorded to the rights of the servient
owner who still retains an interest in the land under the right of way.
He has, for example, been permitted to use those portions of the right of
way not in use by the railroad nor necessary to the safe and convenient
operation of its trains. 12 In like manner he has been permitted to enter
14
on and use the land,13 or the superincumbent air-space over the land, in
15
any manner not inconsistent with its use by the railroad company.
In an effort to work a compromise between these views, the railroad
has been permitted to lease portions of its right of way to concerns whose
operations directly enhance the business of the carrier. It is, perhaps, for
this reason that the plaintiff in the instant case raised no question of the
propriety of a lease for bulk station purposes. But even this practice is an
open invitation to abuse. As was once said in a Pennsylvania decision:
"No one can pretend that a railroad company may build private houses
and mills, or erect machinery, not necessarily connected with the use of
their (sic) franchise, within the limits of their right of way. If it could,
stores, taverns, shops, groceries and dwellings might be made to line the
sides of the road outside of the track-a thing not to be thought of under
the terms of the acquisition of the right of way. The problem is one of
degree."' 6 In this light, the use in the instant case would seem not to be
incidental to the legitimate use of the easement for railroad purposes, but
would appear to constitute an independent use in itself.
Whether or not an abandonment has occurred has been used as a
standard to ascertain whether there has been a proper or an improper
17
use of the right of way in situations like the present one. Such test suggests that if the business were such that it could be continued after the
491, 100 N.E. 942, 44 L. R. A. (N.S.)
11 Checkley v. Ill. Cent. R. Co., 257 Ill.
App. 582 (1885).
1127 (1913); Ill. Cent. R. Co. v. Wathen, 17 Ill.
12 Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co. v. Bunting, 168 N.C. 579, 84 S.E. 1009 (1915).
13 Cleveland, C., C., & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Central Ill. Pub. Service Co., 380 II.
130, 43 N. E. (2d) 993 (1942), noted in 22 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvmw 92; Midland
Valley R. Co. v. Sutter, 28 F. (2d) 163 (1928).
14 Farmers Grain & Supply Co. v. Toledo, P. & W. R. R. Co., 316 Inl App.
116, 44 N.E. (2d) 77 (1942), noted in 22 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REMIEW 92.
15 The general doctrine that the grant of an easement for right of way
purposes does not extend to the sky was recognized in Gulick v. Hamilton, 293
Inl. 126, 127 N.E. 383, 9 A. L. R. 1629 (1920).
16 In re Lance's Appeal, 55 Pa. 16 at 25, 93 Am. Dec. 722 at 726 (1867). The
doctrine of that case was approved in R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Leisy Brewing Co.,
547, 51 N.E. 572 (1898), and it was cited with approval by the Appellate
174 Ill.
Court in its decision in the instant case: 317 Il.App. 501 at 507, 47 N.E. (2d)
115 at 118.
17 See In re Lance's Appeal, 55 Pa. 16, 93 Am. Dec. 722 (1867), where the erection of a coal chute on land condemned for railroad purposes was held to be an
abuse of the power conferred by the easement so created.
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railroad had abandoned its easement and given up its business of transportation, then the use should be held to be not incidental or necessary to
the grant given the railroad. Such was the view in In re Chicago &
s
Northwestern Railway Company' where it was held that the operation
right of way was a misuse of the
a
railroad
upon
of a retail filling station
servient property. The fact that the business received its goods by rail
was held not to be a conclusive factor that the use of the easement was a
)roper one rather than an unwarranted burden.
It is true that decisions differ on this point and support may be found
or either view, but it is suggested that the abandonment test is the
ounder one. If the railroad abandons the right of way, it must necessarily
iso abandon any use peculiar to the railroad business for which it was
iven an easement. If the use of the servient property would automatically
!nd at that time, such use may be regarded as a proper one and clearly
ithin the scope of the railroad's activities. If, however, the business could
:ontinue after the abandonment, such fact would indicate that its life is
tot directly dependent upon the railroad. Not being established as an aid
: the performance of the railroad's primary function, but for a completely
ndependent purpose, it should be regarded as one clearly beyond the
cope of the railroad's activity and not within its power to grant to another
Lnless it owns the right of way in fee.
FRuRniuA MARSTON
HIGHWAYS-OBSTRUCTIONS AND ENCROAcHMENTS--WHETHER 01 Nor OwN-E
PuBLIc HIGHWAY CAN, WITH HIGHWAY CoMMIssIoN-ER's CON-

F FEE UNDER

ENT, ERECT AND MAINTAIN OIL DRILLING EQUIPMENT IF THE SAME DoEs NoT
LMOUNT TO A ToTAL OBsTRUcTION OF THE HIGHWAY FOR PURPOsES OF TRAVE--

novel and interesting application of legal principles was called for in
impson v. Adkins,1 when the Illinois Supreme Court, for the first time, was
sked to decide whether or not an oil drilling lease, sanctioned by the local
ommissioner of highways, was valid if the wells so drilled merely enroached upon but did not obstruct the public way. The plaintiffs therein
rought suit to quiet title to a strip of land entirely occupied by a public
7ay. The defendants claimed under an old tax deed, and sought, by
ounterclaim, to have their rights under certain non-drilling oil leases
indicated so as to prevent the plaintiffs and their lessee from actually
emoving the oil by surface operations. The trial court held that the plainiffs were owners of the strip of land under the highway and, as a conseuence, did own the oil and gas therein but that the maintenance of oil
iells thereon amounted to a public nuisance and directed that the re-2
eiver, whose appointment had been questioned in a companion case,
hould cap the wells below the surface and remove all obstructions from
ae highway. On direct appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court modified the
ecision by upholding the non-drilling lease in favor of the defendants
s being valid, but in all other respects affirmed the decree. In support of

is Sub nom. Hicks v. Thomson, 127 F. (2d) 1001 (1942).

1 386 Ill. 64, 53 N.E. (2d) 979 (1944).
2 Simpson v. Adkins, 311 El. App. 543, 37 N.E. (2d) 355 (1941).
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such holding, the court cited the earlier Illinois case of Snyder v. City of
Mt. Pulaski3 which had laid down the rule that a city had no power to
grant the permanent use of any public highway to private purposes. In
agreement with that position might be added other Illinois cases wherein
to maintain an obstruction
the illegal grant of the highway commissioner
4
was deemed not to be a defense.
The removal of gas and oil below the surface of the highway ought to
be permitted if the highway is not thereby disturbed, since the right of
the owner in fee is limited only by the public right of travel over the
surface. In a New York case, for example, it was held that the owner of
land abutting upon the highway, who also owned the subsurface rights
thereunder, had the right to remove minerals located under the highway
5
by tunneling in such a manner as not to disturb the surface. In much the
same way, a permit for temporary obstruction might be sought if an adequate bridge be maintained over the excavation, provided the owner is
responsible for possible accidents caused thereby and for the rebuilding
6
of the road when the temporary use has ceased.
But highway officials have no power to surrender the use of the highway for private purposes, 7 nor may they authorize the maintenance of a
nuisance on the same.8 If, in authorizing an obstruction, they exceed their
9
powers, such obstruction will be deemed illegal, and cannot be justified
10
subsequently. In Adams v. Atlantic City Electric Company," therefore,
an electric power company was held liable for damage done by its pole
when an automobile collided therewith because it was not placed pursuant
to legislative authority even though the company had a permit from the
state highway commission.
8 176 Ill. 397, 52 N.E. 62, 44 L. R. A. 407 (1898).
4 Town of Canoe Creek v. McEniry, 23 Ill. App. 227 (1886). A license by the
commissioner of highways to build a drainage ditch on right of way which
flooded plaintiff's land was held not to exempt defendant from liability in
Johnson v. Rea, 12 Ill. App 331 (1882). The entire use of a highway. granted to
a railroad by the commissioner of highways in Town of Rice v. Chicago, B. &
N. Ry. Co., 30 Ill. App. 481 (1888), was considered an illegal grant. See also
Pittsburgh, Ft. W. & C. R. R. Co. v. Reich, 101 Ill. 157 (1881).
5 Town of Albion v. Ryan, 194 N. Y. S. 261, 201 App. Div. 717 (1922).
6 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 121, § 167.
7 Driggs v. Phillips, 103 N. Y. 77, 8 N.E. 514 (1886).
8 A township board was held to lack the authority to permit a mill to partially
obstruct a township highway in U. S. Gypsum Co. v. Christenson, 226 Mich. 347,
197 N.W. 497 (1924). Legislative authority to county officials so to do was held ineffective in Sharp v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 110 Neb. 34, 193 N.W. 150 (1923).
9 Dade County v. Snyder, 140 Fla. 135, 191 So. 185 (1939).
10 A fence and gate was erected across a highway prior to enactment of stockgrazing statute. Held, in Duncan v. State, 16 Okl. Cr. 175, 181 P. 736 (1919), that
permit by board of county commissioners was no defense. See also Illinois Central R. Co. v. Ward, 237 Ky. 478, 35 S.W. (2d) 863 (1931), where a railroad
permanently obstructed a public highway leading to two farms. Defense that a
statute authorized the county engineer to change the location of a highway
and that such change had been approved was held unavailing.
11 120 N. J. L. 357, 199 A. 27 (1938). See also Allen v. New York Central R. Co.,
239 N. Y. S. 140, 228 App. Div. 382 (1930), reversing 233 N. Y. S. 445, 133 Misc.
618 (1929).
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The Illinois court in the instant case, however, seems to have predicated its holding on two statutory provisions which make it a criminal
act to obstruct or encroach upon a public highway, 12 rather than upon
these general principles. For that reason, it held that the lease given to
the lessee of the plaintiffs, since it required the drilling of wells on the
property demised, called for the doing of an illegal act, hence was void
inder well-established principles of law. The. court might have found
Lmple support for its decision, even in the absence of such statute, in the
.exas case of Boone v. Clark13 which was a case strikingly similar to the
nstant one on the facts, the law, and the outcome. In that case, one Boone
rocured from the county commissioner's court an oil and gas lease on
L11public roads in the county. The lease stipulated that if any highway
vas obstructed by drilling operations the lessee would pay the cost of
ecuring an additional highway. The lessee also secured leases from the
.djoining fee owners for the county had only an easement of right of way
n the highways. It was held that the county had no authority to make
uch lease, either by statute or by implication, 14 because of a provision
n the Texas penal code which made it a misdemeanor punishable by fine
or any one to wilfully obstruct any public highway. 15 The application of
hat statute had been considered in a prior case, where a right of way
ias been partially obstructed by a fence, 16 just as had been the Illinois
tatute relied on in the instant case. 17 The parallel between the two cases
s too obvious to warrant further comment.
While the outcome of the instant case is obviously the correct one, it
rovides small consolation for the owner of the fee under the highway to
earn that he may remove the minerals and oil from beneath the highway,
)rovided there is no obstruction thereof, if he has no way of reaching the
ame. If the adjoining land is under his control, he may enjoy his prop,rty by drilling to reach the same from the adjoining land, but if he does
iot have abutting property there is no practical value to owning the oil
md gas in place if to reach it he must sink his well on the highway and
hereby create an obstruction thereof with its attendant consequences. As
he local authorities have no power to sanction his operations, unless
specially authorized by statute so to do, 18 his right as owner would seem
o be lacking in utility. His only protection, then, would seem to rest in
oining with his neighbor's operations through participation in a non12 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 38, § 466, declares such conduct to be a public
tuisance, while § 467 states that it shall be no defense that the nuisance "is
rected or continued by virtue or permission of any law of this state." See also
U. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 121, § 167.
1 (Tex. Civ. App.) 214 S.W. 607 (1919).
14 The doctrine of consent by implication has been upheld in Illinois in cases
f vaults under streets: Gridley v. City of Bloomington, 68 Ill. 47 (1873); Nelson
Godfrey, 12 Ill. 20 (1850).
15 Vernon's Tex. Penal Code, Title 13, Ch. 1, § 784.
16 Cornelison v. State, 40 Tex. Cr. 159, 49 S.W. 384 (1899).
17 See Boyd v. Town of Farm Ridge, 103 Ill. 408 (1882).
18 Leases may be so authorized where the public owns the fee: Ontario Natl.
'as Co. v. Gosfield, 18 Ont. App. 626 (1891). See also Thornton, Oil and Gas (W.
[. Anderson Company, Cincinnati, 1932), 5th Ed. rev. by Willis, Vol. II, § 476.
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drilling lease such as was upheld in the instant case. Only in that way,
unless an express statute should be passed sanctioning the conduct here
attempted, can he realize upon his property rights.
FRDERIKA MARSTON
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-UsE AND REGULATION OF PUBLIC PLACES, PROPERTY,

AND

WORKS-WHETHER

STATUTE WHICH

AUTHORIZES

MUNICIPALITY TO

Giv CONCLUSIvE EFFECT TO FINDING
PUBLIC INTEREST IS SUBsERvED THEREBY PREVENTS INQUIRY BY COURTS

VACATE STREETS AND PURPORTS TO

THAT

INTO

FACTUAL BASIS FOR SUCH CONCLUSIoN-By ordinance properly passed, the

City of Chicago vacated about a mile of a certain public street under
1
authority conferred by the Cities and Villages Act. Shortly thereafter,
interested persons filed the case of People ex rel. Foote v. KeUy 2 seeking
a writ of mandamus to compel the city and certain abutting property

owners to remove obstructions from the right of way of the street which
had been vacated. The petition alleged, among other things, that the purported vacation of the public highway was for purely private purposes
and for the exclusive benefit of certain private corporations rather than
for the benefit of the general public. Defendants moved to strike the petition on the ground that the public interest in the vacation of the street was
to be deemed as conclusively established from the passage of an ordinance
to that effect. Such motion to strike having been granted, the cause was
dismissed by the trial judge who certified the case to the Illinois Supreme
Court for direct appeal inasmuch as the constitutionality of a statute and
an ordinance was involved. That court reversed and remanded with directions to overrule the motion and to require the defendants to answer the
petition.
Although the applicable statute declares the determination of the corporate authorities to be "conclusive, and the passage of such an ordinance
is sufficient evidence of that determination, whether so recited in the
ordinance or not,"-3 the opinion of the Supreme Court indicates that if it
be alleged that no public interest exists,-then the judicial department may
review the determination of the legislative department to see if, in fact,
there is any public interest being subserved by the vacation ordinance.
While the plain, ordinary meaning of the language of the statute would
seem to show a clear intent on the part of the legislature to shut out the
courts from all inquiry into the question of public interest, the court
nevertheless concluded that the statute, properly construed, did not preclude judicial inquiry into the question of whether a consideration of public
interest existed or was totally lacking.
1 Il. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 24, § 69-11.
543, 53 N.E. (2d) 429 (1944). Murphy, J., dissented on the ground that
2 385 Ill.

the construction placed on the pertinent statute in People v. Eakin, 383 IlL 383,
50 N.E. (2d) 474 (1943), dictated a contrary result.
8 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 24, § 69-11. The section also states that: "The relief
to the public from further burden and responsibility of maintaining any street
or alley, or part thereof, constitutes a public use or public interest authorizing
the vacation."
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On this question, the court said: "The statute limits the authority of
the courts but it does not assume to deny them the right to examine the
record to see if any public use or interest is subserved in vacating a street
or alley. Properly construed, the statute merely declares the long-established rule that the courts will not inquire whether the subordinate body
selected to exercise the power delegated by the General Assembly acted
wisely or not . . . Courts must not, of course, substitute their judgment
for that of the city council ... The question is, instead, whether the purpose and result of the legislative act . . .is to solely benefit private interests without any semblance of benefit accruing to the public ... discretion
must not be so grossly abused as to amount to a nonexercise of discretion." 4 Without doubt, the statute purported to give the corporate authorities an apparently unlimited and conclusive power and discretion to determine the nature and extent of the public interest to be served by the
vacation of a street or alley. The prime question, therefore, is whether
or not such legislative intention is controlling on the courts.
In that regard, it is well settled that determinations left to the discretion of a person, official, or body are not reviewable, if declared to be so,
when made in the actual exercise of discretion as contrasted with those
which result from purely arbitrary action. 5 Running through decisions on
that point is the doctrine that the proper exercise of discretion is not
negatived by a showing that poor judgment has been used, or that too
much weight has been given to one factor and too little to another. For
example, the United States Supreme Court once said, in reference to a
municipal zoning ordinance, that "if the validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment
must be allowed to control." 6
It is beyond dispute, however, that an entrusted discretion has been
fatally abused when there is no basis whatever for an action, finding, or
determination purportedly made in the exercise of such discretion. It constitutes a clear case of illegality of action, for example, for an officer to
act, or threaten to act, in a capricious and arbitrary manner, 7 as his
conduct should be "regular and governed by rule, not by humor." A failure to disclose that discretion has been exercised is apt to be treated as
385 Ill. 543 at 548, 53 N.E. (2d) 429 at 431.
Two illustrations will suffice. In Roberts v. Richland Irrigation District, 289
U. S. 71, 53 S. Ct. 519, 77 L. Ed. 1038 (1933), for example, the court pointed out
that the action of the public body in apportioning the burden of taxation could
not be assailed unless the same was palpably arbitrary so as to amount to a
plain abuse. United States v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 294 U. S. 50,
55 S. Ct. 326, 79 L. Ed. 752 (1935), holds that mandamus is not available to
compel the commission to set aside an order and make a contrary determination
where that body has determined, in the exercise of its discretion, that the statute
does not authorize the relief prayed for.
6 Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 at 388, 47 S. Ct. 114 at 118, 71 L.
Ed. 303 at 311, 54 A. L. R. 1016 at 1025 (1926).
7 Ickes v. Underwood, 141 F. (2d) 546 (1944).
8 Bouvier, Law Dict. (Rawle's 3d Rev.), I, 885, "Discretion." See also Judges
of Oneida County v. People, 18 Wend. (N.Y.) 79 (1837).
4
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being tantamount to arbitrary action,9 while the adoption of rules that
ignore the differences which invoke discretion will inevitably lead to
judicial condemnation."0
In the light of these principles, the purported conclusiveness of the
ordinance concerned in the instant case must be deemed to yield to the
right of the judicial department to ascertain if discretion has been validly
exercised. To have adopted any other view might have called into question the constitutionality of the fundamental statute upon which the municipal authority in the instant case depended. By taking the view it did,
then, the court was saved from the necessity of considering the constitutional issue which had been raised," and instead it was left free to
reiterate that when acts are done capriciously, or without any foundation
in fact, the judicial branch may intervene to protect the disregarded
rights of the public.
When so doing, according to the dissenting judge, the court was sup12
posedly rejecting the earlier decision in People ex rel. Hill v. Eakin.
That case, however, unlike the present case, did not reach the reviewing
court until after a full trial was had and comprehensive evidence was of
record on both sides bearing on the factual questions. At the time of
upholding the vacation ordinance therein, the court discussed such evidence at length and found that there was a public interest served, hence
it felt itself precluded from inquiring into the wisdom of the vacation or
the extent or nature of the public interest served thereby. Although some
language used therein would indicate that court inquiry was regarded as
prevented by the statute, these statements may well be considered as
dicta. In contrast, the present case went up simply on the sufficiency of
the petitioner's unanswered allegations, which, if true, would well justify
adequate judicial inquiry. The decision in the instant case, therefore,
instead of overruling the Eakin case, is complementary thereto.
Certainly the giving away of public rights to benefit private persons
ought not be permitted without some opportunity for an unbiased investigation of the facts offered in support thereof. Only if that safety factor
has been provided by the legislative body should the courts be bound.
To hold otherwise would result in an offense to principles of justice "so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental. ' $

J. I. BELLAMY
9 Phelps Dodge Corp. v. National Labor Rel. Bd., 313 U. S. 177, 61 S. Ct. 845,
85 L. Ed. 1271 (1941).
1o United States ex rel. Steinmetz v. Allen, 192 U. S. 543, 24 S. Ct. 416, 48 L. Ed.
555 (1904).
11 The challenge was based on the due process sections of the state constitution: Ill. Const. 1870, Art. II, §§ 1 and 2. Also involved was the question of the
proper distribution of powers between the several departments of the state
government under Ill. Const. 1870, Art. III, and the prohibition against special
legislation found in Ill. Const. 1870, Art. IV, § 22.
12 383 Ill. 383, 50 N.E. (2d) 474 (1943).
13 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 at 285, 56 S. Ct. 461 at 464, 80 L. Ed. 682
at 686 (1936).
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PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSIONS-PowER To REGULATE CHARGEs-WHETHER OR
RATE WHICH ENABLES UTILrrY TO MAINTAIN rrs FINANCIAL INTEGRITY IS
SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL INVESTIGATION ON GROUND THAT IT AMOUNTS TO A CONFISCATION OF PROPERTY BECAUSE IT PERMITS ONLY A MEAGER RETURN ON SO-CALLED

NOT

"FAIR VALUE" RATE BAsE--The Federal Power Commission upon its own
motion, but after complaint had been made by two municipalities, insti-

tuted an investigation into the rates charged certain utilities, operating in
several communities in Ohio and Pennsylvania, by the Hope Natural Gas
Company, the operator of a system of natural gas pipe lines. After appropriate proceedings, the Commission found that certain rates charged by
Hope were excessive and ordered a rate reduction.1 The company appealed
such order to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, which reversed
the order and remanded the proceedings, holding that the rate base should
reflect the "present fair value" of the property and that certain items of
property charged to expense during a period prior to federal regulation
should be considered in arriving at such "present fair value. ' 2 The
Supreme Court of the United States, in Federal Power Commission v.
Hope Natural Gas Company,3 overruled the Circuit Court of Appeals and
held that if the rates set by the Commission permitted the utility company
to operate successfully, to attract capital, and to compensate its investors
for the risks assumed, such rates were to be deemed "just and reasonable" within the meaning of the applicable statute and the method of
arriving at such rates was not to be a matter of judicial inquiry.
The fixing of rates for public utilities is a legislative act 4 which may
be delegated 5 and, in the case of natural gas carried in interstate commerce, has been delegated to the Federal Power Commission by the
Natural Gas Act of 1938.6 That statute requires that all rates or charges
in connection with the transportation or sale of natural gas which is subject to the act be just and reasonable and it further declares that any rate
or charge that is not just and reasonable be deemed an unlawful one. 7
It also provides that the Federal Power Commission, upon the complaint

I As reduced, the result meant a cutting down of not less than $3,609,857 in
operating revenues on an annual basis, calculated on a finding that a 6 %
return on an interstate rate base was a fair rate of return. The rate base
established amounted to $33,712,526 which, in the Commission's opinion, represented the "actual legitimate cost" of the company's property less depletion
and depreciation on an "economic-service-life" basis, plus unoperated acreage,
working capital and future net additions: 320 U. S. -, 64 S. Ct. 281 at 284, 88
L. Ed. (adv.) 276 at 279.
2 Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 134 F. (2d) 287 (1943).
8 320 U. S. -, 64 S. Ct. 281, 88 L. Ed. (adv.) 276 (1944).
4 Chicago & G. T. R. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U. S. 339, 12 S. Ct. 400, 36 L. Ed.
176 (1892); Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352, 33 S. Ct. 729, 57 L. Ed. 1511, 48
L. R. A. (N.S.) 1151 (1913); Los Angeles G. & E. Corp. v. Railroad Com., 289
U. S.287, 53 S. Ct. 637, 77 L. Ed. 1180 (1933).
5 Interstate Commerce Com. v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 227 U. S. 88, 33 S. Ct.
185, 57 L. Ed. 431 (1913); Virginian R. Co. v. United States, 272 U. S. 658, 47 S.Ct.
222, 71 L. Ed. 463(1926).
6 15 U. S. C. A. § 717 et seq.
7 Ibid., § 717c(a).

CHICAGO-KENT

LAW REVIEW

of any state, municipality, state commission, or gas distributing company,
or upon its own motion, whenever it finds that any rate is unjust or unreasonable, shall determine the rate to be thereafter observed and in
force, and shall fix the same by order. It may order a decrease when
8
existing rates are unlawful or are not the lowest reasonable rates. Under
this authority the Federal Power Commission, in the instant case, applying the "prudent investment" theory, found a rate which it declared to be
"just and reasonable." 9
10
Rate-making is deemed to be a form of price fixing. In fixing rates,
however, it has been held to be immaterial that the rate set has reduced
1
and all that has been
the value of the property used in the business,
deemed reviewable has been whether the result reached has been obtained in accordance with the standards set out in the statute delegating
12
the authority, unless confiscation of the property has been claimed.
If confiscation of property is claimed because the rate set is alleged to be
too low, the burden of making a convincing showing of confiscation is upon
the utility company.' 3 It was held, in the instant case, that such a showing
was not made by the company.
Taking the instant case in conjunction with Federal Power Commis14
sion v. Natural Gas Pipeline Company of America the court, by specifically repudiating the holding in United Railways & Electric Company of
Baltimore v. West' 5 to the effect that the present fair market value of the
property of the utility company is the proper basis for depreciation as
well as for the computation of the investment in property on which a fair
return should be allowed, seems to be abandoning the so-called rule in
Smyth v. Ames. 16 The court also seems to be deciding that commissions
and legislatures are to determine utility rates without judicial interven17
This
tion unless confiscation of property can be shown convincingly.
represents a shading of the view once held by the court that whenever
the question of confiscation of property was in point an opportunity was to
be had for submitting the issue to a judicial tribunal for determination
18
upon its own independent judgment both as to facts and law. The court
8

Ibid., § 717d(a).

9

See, for example, Los Angeles G. & E. Corp. v. Railroad Com., 289 U. S. 287,

53 S.Ct. 637, 77 L. Ed. 1180 (1933).
10 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. Ed. 77 (1877).

11 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 54 S. Ct. 505, 78 L. Ed. 940 (1934); Block
v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135, 41 S. Ct. 458, 65 L. Ed. 865 (1921).
12 Federal Power Com. v. Nat. Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U. S. 575, 62 S. Ct. 736, 86
L. Ed. 1037 (1942); West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Utilities Com., 294 U. S. 63, 55
S. Ct. 316, 79 L. Ed. 761 (1935).
13 Railroad Commission v. Cumberland Teleph. & Teleg. Co., 212 U. S. 414, 29
S. Ct. 357, 53 L. Ed. 577 (1909); Lindheimer v. Illinois Bell Teleph. Co., 292 U. S.
151, 54 S. Ct. 658, 78 L. Ed. 1182 (1934).
14 315 U. S. 575, 62 S. Ct. 736, 86 L. Ed. 1037 (1942).
15 280 U. S. 234, 50 S. Ct. 123, 74 L. Ed. 390 (1930).
16 169 U. S. 466, 18 S. Ct. 418, 42 L. Ed. 819 (1898).
L. Rev. 517 (1938).
17 See Hale, "The 'Fair Value' Merry-Go-Round," 33 Ill.
18 Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287, 40 S. Ct. 527,
64 L. Ed. 908 (1920).
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now avoids the Fourteenth Amendment by a holding that no convincing
showing of confiscation has been made, hence no review is necessary,
Such action would appear to be an effort to leave the matter of utility
rates to commissions and legislatures while retaining the right to inquire
into the matter of rates if the court should find it necessary at some later
date.
The theory now apparently settled by the court is that if the rates set
provide an income adequate for a fair return on the depreciated "original
cost" of the utility property, measured by the test of whether the resultant
income is sufficient to keep the company's securities financially attractive, the rates will be upheld as being just and reasonable. Since, as
stated in the instant case, the regulation of rates is not applied with the
intent of insuring that there will be profits from which interest on bonds
and dividends on stocks representing money invested in the enterprise
may be paid, the application of the theory of the present case will only
serve to place a constantly lowering ceiling on the earnings of the regulated business. Such a result might well be produced by the instigation
of a rate case when economic conditions are such that the volume of business is larger than the average the company may expect and security
markets reflect sales of securities at good prices in relation to earnings.
When such conditions exist it should not be hard for a commission to
order generous reductions in rates which will still permit the securities
to sell at fair prices. On the other hand, when business is less favorable,
as it has been from time to time in the past, earnings may fall to a point
low enough to force the company to recapitalize with less securities outstanding or with securities of reduced par value resulting from deficits
in operation which have been underwritten by the security holders. The
lowered values and reduced capitalization become in turn the basis for
a further reduction in rates during the next period of improved business
and security prices. Over the course of several such periods of economic
change, the property of a utility *company could be appropriated to the
public use and the resulting loss would have to be borne by the security
holder either through the form of a smaller return or by an actual impairment of his capital.
It was originally thought that one who put his property to public use
was required to submit to public regulation in order that a fair bargain
might be had by the public but, since the public did not guarantee to
provide business, it should hire the property used therein at its then fair
market value. Obviously, there were risks to the one venturing his property and there were opportunities to gain through the inflation of property
values which might occur through the years, but it was generally felt
that this would be only fair in view of the fact that a new invention might
make his business entirely obsolete. This balancing of risks and rewards
seems to have been overlooked by the courts in their acquiescence in government by administrative bodies which sometimes place undue reliance
on bookkeeping forms. An example might be the reliance placed by the
Federal Power Commission on the theory of "cost when the property was
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first dedicated to public use," which altogether overlooks the broader
question of what is public use and when dedication to public use for a
particular purpose first occurs.
Further consideration of the question of property values seems necessary if a sound rule is to be developed which will protect the public investing in securities of public utilities, as well as the public which uses the
utility service.
L. A. SWANSON

WILLS-PROBATE, ESTABLISHMENT, AND ANNULMENT-WHEH ER AMENDMENT TO STATUTE WHICH SHORTENS TInE IN WHICH TO Fu.E WILL CONTEST
PROCEEDING APPLIES TO Wi.Ls ALREADY PROBATED BEFORE SUCH STATUTORY
MODIFIcATION-In the case of McQueen v. Connor' a will had been admitted
to probate of June 20, 1939, and contest thereof was instituted on June 17,
1940, within the one-year period allowed by law in force at the time of the
death of the testator and effective at the time of probate. After probate,
but before the institution of the suit to contest, Section 90 of the new Illinois
Probate Act became operative by the terms of which the time for filing
2
complaints to contest wills was reduced to nine months. Motion to dismiss the contest proceedings for lack of jurisdiction was sustained by the
trial court, and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed on the ground that
the right to sue had expired on March 20, 1940.
Since the common law in force in Illinois is only such as existed in
England in the year 1606-7 A.D., with certain exceptions specifically mentioned in the statute, 3 the law relating to wills, at least in this state, is
entirely statutory. Authority to make wills was given by the Ordinance
for the Northwest Territory 4 and has, ever since, been regulated by legislative provision. In the same way, the right of contest rests upon statutory
grounds and may be exercised only pursuant thereto. There is no possibility of doubt, then, that if there is a change in the law before the death
of the testator occurs, the new law will operate, for there can be no vested
right in a bequest or a devise until the will becomes effective. The instant
case, however, deals with the effect of changes occurring subsequent to
death and probate.
The probate of a will, as provided by statute, merely requires the
5
making of prima facie proof of compliance with statutory requirements.
Under earlier laws, no provision was made for notice to interested per6
sons, hence such proceedings could not be deemed res judicata. As a con1 385 Ill. 455, 53 N.E. (2d) 435 (1944). Direct appeal to the Supreme Court was
permitted because the will disposed of real estate.
Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 3, § 242.
2 Ill.
8 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 28; Lasier v. Wright, 304 Ill. 130, 136 N.E. 545 (1922).
4 The language thereof was: "Estates in the said territory may be devised
or bequeathed by wills in writing, signed and sealed by him or her in whom
"
the estate may be (being of full age) and attested by three witnesses ..
See Thorpe, American Charters, Constitutions, and Organic Laws (Washington,
1909). II, p. 958.
5 1ll. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch.3, § 221.
401, 148 N.E. 274 (1925).
6 Buerger v. Buerger, 317 Ill.
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sequence, on appeal from the probate of a will a trial de novo was had at
which, in addition to the evidence admitted by the probate court, any
other evidence competent in chancery was admissible.7 If probate was
affirmed, it would seem that the respective rights of the heirs, devisees,
and legatees in and to the decedent's property should then be regarded as
vested and established as of the time when the will was first admitted to
probate. If not, they were certainly vested when probate was affirmed on
appeal and certified to the probate court. At that stage, if not before, the
executor would begin to act and creditors might file their claims within
the statutory period measured from the issuance of letters testamentary. 8
Some light may be thrown on the problem from a consideration of the
rights of a claimant to file his claim against the estate. The period in
which to file such claim has been longer under earlier Illinois laws, 9 but
.whenever changes were enacted shortening such period it was consistently
held that the right to file a claim constituted a vested right in the claimant,
accruing when letters were issued, so that any shortening in the filing
period could only apply prospectively to estates in which letters were
granted subsequent to the change in the statute. 0 Such change was treated
as being prospective only because the limitation of time operated in the
nature of a statute of limitation rather than as a condition to the existence
of the right or as a prerequisite to the existence of jurisdiction in the
court. If any analogy existed between the rights of claimants and those
filing will contest proceedings, it would be expected that the same rule
should apply to the latter.
The right to contest a will already admitted to probate, however, may
not be on the same plane as no counterpart for such action existed at
common law and it exists today only by virtue of Section 90 of the Probate
Act." As is the case with probate matters generally, then, will contests
are not common-law but statutory proceedings. The Illinois Supreme Court
7

IMl. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 3, § 223.

8 Ibid., §§ 344 and 356. Claims so filed might be regarded as conferring vested

rights on the creditors, although their validity might remain to be determined
by a jury in accordance with Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 3, § 349.
9 It was two years under Section 70 of the Administration Act: Laws 1871-2, p.
77, § 70; it was reduced to one year in 1903 by Laws 1903, p. 3, § 1.
10 Hathaway v. Merchants' Loan & Trust Co., 218 Ill. 580, 75 N.E. 1060 (1905).
It is interesting to note that a claim for wages has been held entitled to
preference in payment whether the services were rendered before or after the
passage of the statute establishing such preference, the right thereto being regarded as vested at the time when letters were issued: Chicago Title & Trust Co.
v. McGlew, 193 Ill. 457, 61 N.E. 1018 (1901).
11 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 3, § 242. The text thereof is the same as Section 7 of
the former Wills Act: Cahill's Il. Rev. Stat. 1933, Ch. 148, § 7. In a note thereto,
the editor states: "This statute was originally adopted from Virginia through
Kentucky. In Virginia, by statute of 1748 (5 Hen. St. at Large, 454), the English
chancery remedy was adopted by the House of Burgesses, and the period of
limitation cut down from thirty years to ten years. By Act of 1785 (State of
Virginia), it was reduced to seven years; by Act of 1797 (Kentucky), it was
continued at seven years; by Act of January 13, 1829 (Illinois R. L. 1829, p. 193,
1 5), it was reduced to five years . . . by Act of 1903 it was reduced to one year."
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has even said that the right "to contest a will is not a vested one. The
legislature, if it saw fit, could abrogate all the provisions of our statutes
authorizing will contests."'1 2 Such proceedings might seem unnecessary.
inasmuch as all important issues might well be litigated at the time of
admission to probate. At the time when will contests were originally
provided for, how,'ever, the probate of a will consisted merely of proof of
a prima facie case. The purpose of contest was, therefore, to provide for
a complete determination of the validity of the will with a full disclosure
of all the evidence. 13 It is for this reason that the decision of a probate
court does not have the binding force of res judicata so as to preclude
14
further contest, and new points of law or evidence might still be raised.
It being clear that the right to contest a will is an additional remedy provided by statute, the question remains can such right be taken away by
the legislature and, if so, as of what time?
The answer involves a consideration of general principles of statutory
construction, to determine whether a change in law should be given retroactive effect or should only apply to rights accruing subsequently. Since
15
there is no provision in the Illinois Constitution against retroactive laws,
resort must be had to general rules and to statutory principles of construction. One such principle is that no new law shall be construed to repeal a
former law, whether such former law is expressly repealed thereby or
not, as to any right accrued before the new law takes effect. 16 It reiterates
the requirement of due process of law, which prevents the taking away,
by subsequent legislation, of any right which is already vested. Resolution of the problem, then, requires a determination of just what constitutes
a vested right.
It has been decided that a right of action for personal injuries, vested
before an amendment to the statute regulating such right, could not be
disturbed by such amendment, the same being regarded as applicable
only to negligent acts occurring after the amendment.' 7 In much the same
12 Masin v. Bassford, 381 IIl. 569 at 572, 46 N.E. (2d) 366 at 367 (1943), quoting
from Dibble v. Winter, 247 Ill. 243, 93 N.E. 145 (1910).
1 Buerger v. Buerger, 317 Ill. 401, 148 N.E. 274 (1925).
14 Dowling v. Gilliland, 275 Ill. 76, 113 N.E. 987 (1916).
15 In Colorado, for instance, the state constitution prohibits retroactive laws:
Colo. Const. (1876), Art. II, §11. As a consequence, it has been held that an
action for wrongful death might be brought after the repeal of the statute creating the cause of action on the basis that the right to recover was vested at the
time of death and could not thereafter be curtailed. See Denver, etc., Ry. Co. v.
Woodward, 4 Colo. 162 (1878), and Lundin v. Kansas Pac. Ry. Co., 4 Colo. 433
(1878). Contrast such result with the Illinois decisions in wrongful death actions
discussed post, notes 24 to 27.
16 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 131, §4, declares: "No new law shall be construed
to repeal a former law, whether such former law is expressly repealed or not,
as to... any right accrued, or claim arising under the former law, or in any way
whatever to affect any.. .right accrued or claim arising before the new law takes
effect, save only that the proceedings thereafter shall conform, so far as
practicable, to the laws in force at the time of such proceeding."
App. 335 (1914); Cooney v. F.
17 Shinners v. Royal Coal & Mining Co., 188 Ill.
Landon Cartage Co., 308 IM. App. 444, 32 N.E. (2d) 403 (1941).
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way, when the right of action was based on the negligence of a municipality, a statutory requirement for notice thereto enacted subsequent to
the accident was treated as being inapplicable to a right already vested.18
It has also been pointed out that the right to file a claim against a
decedent's estate may not be curtailed by retroactive legislation. If then,
the right to contest a will already probated amounts to a vested right,
subsequent statutory amendment should have no effect thereon.
If the right is a statutory one, though, distinctions may arise. For
example, there may be a vested right to have the controversy determined
by some form of judicial proceeding, supplemented by an additional
statutory remedy. In such case, the taking away of the special remedy
will leave unaffected the fundamental vested right. 19 If, however, the right
itself is entirely statutory, then it may be repealed or modified by legislative fiat without violating any constitutional provision or statutory rule.
Thus, in cases where school teachers' pensions are not supported by
vested contractual rights, the amount of pension payments may be later
reduced. 20 If the amending statute purports to affect pending litigation,
it will be given that effect, so that an original judgment will be set aside if
the amendment occurs during the pendency of an appeal therefrom. An
illustration of this may be found in the case of Vance v. Rankin21 where
a statute repealed a law which had provided for the disconnection of territory included in a city or a village. The repealing law purported to apply
to all cases where property had not yet been disconnected, whether application for that relief had been made or not. A writ of mandamus granted
by the lower court before the original law had been repealed was later
denied by the Supreme Court by reason of the intervening legislation.
In much the same way, if a statute provides for the refund of excess taxes
paid on an overassessment and a suit for refund had been filed accordingly, such statute may be repealed effectively even after a judgment has
22
been recovered, so long as the~case is pending on appeal.

i. App. 163 (1914).
19 In South Carolina v. Gaillard, 101 U. S. 433, 25 L. Ed. 937 (1880). a special act
of South Carolina provided a special procedure to determine the validity of tender
of bills of the Bank of South Carolina offered in payment of taxes. That statute
was repealed after tender but before suit was brought. It was held that the special remedy was effectively repealed, but that this left unimpaired the right to
assert the state's contract to pay on the bank's paper so that the right to litigate
that issue was unaffected.
20 Dodge v. Board of Education, 364 Ill. 547, 5 N.E. (2d) 84 (1936), affirmed
in 302 U. S. 74, 82 L. Ed. 57, 58 S. Ct. 98 (1937). It must be noted, however, that
amendments of this character are not presumed to be retroactive and will be
given that effect only if the legislative intention to make them such clearly appears: United States v. Borden Co., 308 U. S. 188, 60 S. Ct. 182, 84 L. Ed. 181 (1939);
United States v. Jackson, 302 U. S. 628, 58 S. Ct. 390, 82 L. Ed. 488 (1938); Kxome
v. Halbert, 263 Ill. 172, 104 N.E. 1066 (1914).
21 194 IlM.625, 62 N.E. 807 (1902).
22 People ex rel. Eitel v. Lindheimer, 371 l. 367, 21 N.E. (2d) 318 (1939), cert
den. 308 U. S. 505, 60 S. Ct. 112, 84 L. Ed. 432 (1939). But in Moore Ice Cream
Co. v. Rose, 289 U. S. 373, 53 S. Ct. 620, 77 L. Ed. 1265 (1933), it was held that a
18 Ryan v. City of Chicago, 187

306

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

When the right to sue is not entirely abolished but is in some way
limited or restricted, a dispute is likely to arise based upon whether the
right or only the remedy is affected. The rate of interest on a debt, for
example, if not determined by contract but rather resting on a statute,
appears to be a part of the right to collect the debt. As a consequence,
if the rate is reduced by statutory change, the higher rate in effect at the
time of sale under judgment or mortgage foreclosure will prevail in case
of redemption rather than the rate at the time of redemption. 23 The right
to collect interest at the rate provided by law at the time of sale is treated
as a vested one rather than an incidental remedy to the collection of the
judgment.
The attitude to be taken in wrongful death actions, on the other hand,
seems to have baffled the Illinois courts somewhat. It has been decided
that although the statute grants a right of action there is no comparable
right to a definite period of time within which to sue. Applying that view,
the Appellate Court for the Fourth District was led to decide that this
period of time could be reduced. 24 In direct contrast is a later decision by
the Appellate Court for the First District holding that the time within
which to file suit is not a condition precedent to the vesting of a right, the
same to exist only when filing was completed, but rather was a limitation
upon the time in which to file, which was not subject to reduction by a
25
A comsubsequent statute unless the same was clearly retroactive.
parable problem was produced when the Mines and Miners Act was
amended to reduce the time in which to sue to one year. It was held, in
Gruber v. La Salle County Carbon Coal Company,26 that as there was no
expression of legislative intention to make the amendment retroactive
suit could be brought within the period fixed at the time the death
occurred. Such decision may have been influenced by the fact that, prior
to amendment, the law had allowed five years for suit; that sixteen
months of that period had elapsed at the time of the change; but that only
six weeks were left in which to sue before the new law became effective
to bar suit. If the change had been given retroactive effect, its application would have been unjust and unreasonable. In another case involving
the same question, however, the Illinois Supreme Court found an intent to
make the amended statute retroactive in operation because of the absence
of a saving clause and also because of a prohibition against the "prosecustatute permitting waiver of notice of tax protest could not be retroactively repealed, and recovery was allowed the taxpayer because of the unjust enrichment
of the government.
23 Kufke v. Blume, 304 Ill. 288, 136 N.E. 678 (1922); Bauer Grocer Co. v. Zelle,
172 M. 407, 50 N.E. 238 (1898).
24 Dare v. Wabash, Chester & Western R. R. Co., 119 Il. App. 256 (1905);
Staunton Coal Co. v. Fischer, 119 Il App. 284 (1905). The time within which to
sue was reduced, in 1903, from two years to one year, the latter limit being in
effect when these suits were filed. The decisions therein seem to have been
based on Spaulding v. White, 173 Ill. 127, 50 N.E. 224 (1898), which was a will
contest case and, therefore, distinguishable.
25 O'Donnell v. Healy, 134 III. App. 187 (1907).
26 150 Ill. App. 427 (1909).
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27
tion" of suits as well as against the "bringing" of them.
Judging by the history of statutes governing will contests, it would
appear that the right to contest a will may well be considered as a special
statutory remedy, particularly since it is supplementary to probate proceedings in which, on appeal at least, a fair consideration of the merits is
available. 28 It would seem, then, that the legislature is not entirely without warrant in substituting a shorter period for the commencement of
will contest cases in place of the longer period hitherto prevailing and
also in making such statute retroactive in operation.
There is some question, however, as to the wisdom of such action.
Ordinary probate proceedings fail to provide sufficient notice to all parties
who might be interested and it is often impracticable to give them such
notice therein. There may be devisees or legatees under another will, or
beneficiaries under contracts to make a will, whose existence is unknown
to the court and to the parties before the court. Such persons may get
indirect notice of the existence of probate proceedings when publication
for claims is made. They might then wish to come in and object to probate
or seek to appeal therefrom but by that time it is normally too late.
A remedy such as a will contest proceeding is, then, a necessity to provide
adequate protection for such parties. It may be that the right to such a
remedy need not vest until notice of some sort has been given, but, if it
has been given, the interests of such persons have been given sufficient
protection if they are allowed a reasonable time to file complaint for contest after such notice. As soon as this premise is admitted, it follows that
29
the conditions of the existing statute must be complied with strictly.
Especially is this true in Illinois as it has been held that there is no absolute right to contest a will and no true vested property right arises until
27 See the history of Wall v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., which first appeared
App. 431 (1902). Reversed in 200 Ill. 66, 65 N.E. 632 (1902), the case
in 101 Ill.
was returned to the trial court. In 210 Ill. App. 136 (1918), a judgment on a verdict
for $10,000 was affirmed, but later reversed in 290 Ill. 227, 125 N.E. 20 (1919).
The United States Supreme Court, in 256 U. S. 125, 41 S. Ct. 402, 65 L. Ed. 856
(1921). dismissed certiorari for want of jurisdiction on the ground that the constitutional issue had not been raised early enough. The question of the constitutionality of a statutory amendment reducing the time limit in which to sue as
applied to existing rights of action, if no time is left, might still be open for litigation.
28 It seems, however, that litigation of all the issues is precluded as to appeals
involving existing wills, although there is no such limitation in the case of lost
50, 35 N.E. (2d) 334 (1941), noted in 21 CHICAGOwills: Bley v. Luebeck, 377 Ill.
KENT LAw Rzviaw 63.
29 Cronheim v. Loveman, 225 Ala. 199, 142 So. 550 (1932); Manning v. Manning,
(Ark.) 175 S.W. (2d) 982 (1943); Security Trust & Savings Bank v. Superior Court,
21 Cal. App. (2d) 551, 69 P. (2d) 921 (1937); Crawfordsvlle Trust Co. v. Ramsey;
178 Ind. 258, 98 N.E. 177 (1912); In re Duffy's Estate, 228 Ia. 426, 292 N.W.
165 (1940); Medill v. Snyder, 71 Kan. 590, 81 P. 216 (1905); Butts v. Ruthven, 292
Mich. 602, 291 N.W. 23 (1940); Campbell v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 346 Mo. 200,
139 S.W. (2d) 935 (1940); In re Augestad's Estate, 107 Mont. 619, 88 P. (2d) 32
(1939); In re Martinez' Will, 47 N. Mex. 6, 132 P. (2d) 422 (1943); Case v. Smith,
142 Ohio St. 95, 50 N.E. (2d) 142 (1943); Branch v. Branch, 172 Va. 413, 2 S.E.
(2d) 327 (1939); In re Kane's estate,-Wash.-, 145 P. (2d) 893 (1944).
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80
the claim of invalidity has been reduced to judgment. As the requireamendment of the
element,
ment of filing in apt time is a jurisdictional
8
law might well prevent any right from ever vesting. '
It might be argued that the saving clause of the present Probate
Act,8 2 adding to provisions in prior laws the additional saving of any
"remedy accrued," has changed such rule. A clear vested right would be
saved even without this provision because of constitutional protection.
It does seem possible, then, that the addition of the words "remedy
accrued" might have been intended to preserve not only substantive
88
The use of the
rights but also remedial provisions previously in effect
word "accrued" might have been intended to apply especially to remedial provisions, as distinguished from vested ones, since in order for a
remedial provision to result in anything vested it would first have to be
prosecuted all the way to final judgment after exhausting all appeals.
The McQueen case, however, rejects any such argument and decides that
even if such were the intention of the legislature it is not expressed
strongly enough to produce a change in the prior condition of things.
Changes in the very nature of the right to contest a will have at times
been intended by the legislature. As evidence, it might be noted that while
the earlier law provided for the saving of the right of contest to infants
and persons non compos rnentis,s4 such provision was omitted from the
new Probate Act. Conversely, the provisions of present Section 90 relating
to the survival of the right of contest in favor of representatives of potential contestants, and even to their grantees and assignees, did not appear
on the statute books until 1919.85 But the benefit of these changes has been
held inapplicable to contest proceedings pending at the time of the amend-

ment because the survival of a cause of action, being an aspect of a substantive right, must attach at the time when the right to contest comes
into existence. It could thereafter be enforced by revival, for such amounts
only to remedial or adjective procedure. 6
80 Spaulding v. White, 173 Ill. 127, 50 N.E. 224 (1898); People v. Clark, 283 Ill.
221, 119 N.E. 329 (1918).
81 Sharp v. Sharp, 213 Ill. 332, 72 N.E. 1058 (1905); Wall v. Chesapeake & Ohio
Ry. Co., 290 Ill. 227, 125 N.E: 20 (1919).
82 I. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 3, §501.
88 Illinois Probate Act Annotated (Foundation Press, Chicago, 1940), 323, states
that "the procedural provisions of the Probate Act will apply not merely to proceedings begun after January 1, 1940, to enforce rights theretofore accrued, but
also to proceedings pending on that date."
84 The rights of infants or persons non compos mentis to contest a will after
removal of their respective disabilities was saved under Section 7 of the
former Wills Act: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 148, § 7. The Probate Act replaced that
section with a much shorter one from which that particular provision was 'eliminated: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 3, §242. The deletion was held constitutional and
applicable in Masin v..Bassford, 381 I. 569, 46 N.E. (2d) 366 (1943), noted in 22
CHCAGo-KENT LAw REvrxw 55.
85 The change was introduced by an act approved June 28, 1919: Laws 1919,

p.,992, §7. See also Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 3, §242.
86 Havill v. Havill, 332 Ill. 11, 163 N.E. 428 (1928). It is not too easy to see why
a will contest, if purely remedial, can include as incidental thereto a substantive

DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS

In many instances, when there is a change in the time limited by
statute for filing a will contest, there is ample notice of the change and
sufficient time is left for interested parties to file. Such, at least, was the
situation in the instant case, so no great hardship would result from the
application of the newer provision. But it might happen that when the
time for contesting is shortened, the shorter period has already elapsed
or is about to do so. It will then be up to the parties, or their counsel, to
become promptly informed of the new law so as to protect their interests
accordingly. This may be difficult to achieve, 7 but the difficulty is usually
minimized when, as in the statute here concerned, the effective date of
the new law is postponed until a reasonably substantial time subsequent
to the date of its enactment.

G.
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right to the survival of the action; nor, for that matter, if a will contest be
considered a substantive right so as to permit survival, what makes it a mere
remedial right for the purpose of determining the period during which the complaint may be filed. The only answer would seem to be that the statute so provides, however illogical such result may seem.
37 See, for instance, Wall v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 290 Ill. 227, 125 N.E.
20 (1919), a wrongful death action; and Sharp v. Sharp, 213 Ill. 332, 72 N.E. 1058
(1905), a will contest case. Only about six weeks were left in the latter case before the effective date of the new law.

